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Non-technical summary
The investigation of the impact of European regional policy on economic
growth and convergence has been intensified over the last decade. However,
the results are not clear-cut. While some authors do find evidence of a
significant positive impact of structural funds on economic growth, others
find weak or even no impact at all. There are many reasons for these mixed
results, among others, the low quality of structural funds data at the regional
level and a number of methodological problems.
Against this background, this paper analyses the growth effects of EU
structural funds using a new panel dataset of 124 NUTS-1 / NUTS-2 re-
gions over the time period 1995–2005. We extend the current literature with
regard to at least three aspects: First of all, we extend the time period of in-
vestigation using structural funds payments of the last Financial Perspective
2000–2006 that have not been analysed before. Second, we use more precise
measures of structural funds by distinguishing between Objective 1, 2 and 3
payments and by investigating the impact of time lags more carefully. Third,
we examine the robustness of our results by comparing different economet-
ric approaches highlighting specific methodological problems. Apart from
“classical” panel data methods (like system GMM), we apply spatial panel
econometric techniques.
The empirical evidence indicates that the Objective 1 payments in par-
ticular have a positive and significant impact on growth. In contrast, both
Objective 2 and Objective 3 payments negatively affect the regions’ growth
rates. Moreover, the results show that the time lag plays a key role in affect-
ing the results. We find that the growth impact does not appear immediately.
Instead, our results indicate that it occurs with a time lag of approximately
two to three years.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Anzahl an Studien, welche den Einfluss der europa¨ischen Strukturfonds-
zahlungen auf die Fo¨rderung von Wirtschaftswachstum bzw. Konvergenz zu
erkla¨ren versuchen, hat in der Vergangenheit deutlich zugenommen. Aller-
dings sind die Ergebnisse weiterhin nicht eindeutig. Wa¨hrend einige Autoren
Evidenz fu¨r einen signifikant positiven Einfluss der Strukturfonds auf das
Wirtschaftswachstum finden, finden andere Autoren nur schwache oder keine
Evidenz fu¨r einen solchen Zusammenhang. Es gibt eine Vielzahl an Erkla¨-
rungen fu¨r die divergierenden Ergebnisse, unter anderem die schlechte Daten-
qualita¨t auf regionaler Ebene sowie eine Reihe methodologischer Probleme.
Vor diesem Hintergrund werden in diesem Papier mit Hilfe von Panel-
datenverfahren die Wachstumseffekte der europa¨ischen Strukturpolitik unter
Beru¨cksichtigung von 124 NUTS-1 / NUTS-2 Regionen fu¨r die Periode 1995–
2005 untersucht. Die bestehende Literatur wird hierbei um mindestens drei
Aspekte erweitert: Erstens wird der Untersuchungshorizont erstmals auf
Strukturfondszahlungen aus der Finanziellen Vorausschau 2000–2006 aus-
gedehnt. Zweitens verwenden wir pra¨zisere Maße fu¨r Strukturfondszahlungen,
indem wir zwischen den einzelnen Zieldefinitionen (Ziel 1, Ziel 2, Ziel 3 Zah-
lungen) unterscheiden sowie den Einfluss so genannter Zeitlags genauer un-
tersuchen. Drittens u¨berpru¨fen wir die Robustheit unserer Ergebnisse, in-
dem wir unterschiedliche o¨konometrische Ansa¨tze verwenden, um diverse
methodologische Probleme zu beru¨cksichtigen. Abgesehen von klassischen
Paneldatenverfahren (wie zum Beispiel im Rahmen eines “system GMM”
Ansatzes), verwenden wir ebenfalls Methoden, die fu¨r ra¨umliche Spillover
Effekte kontrollieren.
Die empirischen Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass insbesondere die Ziel
1 Zahlungen einen positiven Einfluss auf das Wirtschaftswachstum haben. Im
Gegensatz dazu haben sowohl Ziel 2 als auch Ziel 3 Zahlungen einen negativen
Einfluss auf die Wachstumsraten der untersuchten Regionen. Zudem zeigen
unsere Ergebnisse, dass die Beru¨cksichtigung von Zeitlags einen erheblichen
Einfluss hat. Wir finden heraus, dass die Strukturfonds nicht sofort wirksam
werden, sondern dass deren Effektivita¨t erst mit einer zwei- bis dreija¨hrigen
Verzo¨gerung eintritt.
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1 Introduction
More than one third of the EU’s total budget is spent on so-called Cohesion
Policy via the structural funds. Its main purpose is to promote the “overall
harmonious development” of the EU, to reduce disparities between the levels
of development, and to strengthen its “economic and social cohesion” (Art.
158 TEC).
Investigating the impact of European structural funds on the economic
growth and convergence process is a wide research topic. Nevertheless, the
empirical evidence has provided mixed, if not to say, contradictory results.
While some authors do find evidence of a positive impact of structural funds
on economic growth (Eggert, von Ehrlich, Fenge, and Ko¨nig, 2007; Bouvet,
2005; Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg, and Verspagen, 2003), others find
weak (Percoco, 2005; Bussoletti and Esposti, 2004) or even no impact at all
(Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2007; de Freitag, Pereira, and Torres, 2003; Garc´ıa-
Mila´ and McGuire, 2001). There are many reasons for these mixed results,
among others, the low quality of structural funds data at the regional level
and a number of methodological problems.
Against this background, this paper addresses these issues by using a
new structural funds dataset of 124 NUTS-1 / NUTS-2 regions over the
time period 1995–2005. We extend the current literature with regard to
at least three aspects: First of all, we investigate the impact of structural
funds payments of the last Financial Perspective 2000–2006, which have not
been analysed before. Second, we use more precise measures of payments of
structural funds by distinguishing between Objective 1, 2, and 3 payments
and by investigating the time lag of effectiveness in greater detail. Finally, we
examine the robustness of our results by comparing a wide range of different
panel econometric approaches highlighting specific methodological problems.
In doing so, we control for heteroskedasticity, serial and spatial correlation
as well as for endogeneity.
Our results indicate that Objective 1 payments in particular do in fact
promote growth, whereas both Objective 2 and Objective 3 payments have
a negative influence on the regions’ growth rates. Furthermore, we find that
time lags affect the results significantly, so that the growth impact does not
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occur immediately, but with a time lag of approximately two to three years.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the litera-
ture on the impact of structural funds on economic growth and the economic
convergence process, respectively. Section 3 discusses the econometric chal-
lenges. Subsequently, the dataset is described in section 4, followed by a
presentation of the econometric analyses in section 5. Finally, section 6 con-
cludes.
2 Literature review
This section briefly reviews the literature on the impact of structural funds on
economic growth and convergence, respectively. While some papers use coun-
try data (e.g., Ba¨hr, 2008; Ederveen, de Groot, and Nahuis, 2006; Beugelsdijk
and Eijffinger, 2005), this review focuses exclusively on papers using regional
data. The main aspects of the previous papers are summarised in Table 1.
Generally, the literature review does not lead to clear-cut results. Some
authors do find empirical evidence for a positive impact of European struc-
tural funds. The conclusions are based on different sample sizes: Bussoletti
and Esposti (2004) use an EU-15 sample, whereas smaller samples are used
by Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg, and Verspagen (2003) (EU-9) or Bouvet
(2005) (EU-8). Some studies even concentrate on single country studies such
as Eggert, von Ehrlich, Fenge, and Ko¨nig (2007) (Germany) or Antunes and
Soukiazis (2005) (Portugal). Furthermore, some authors do not find a sta-
tistically significant impact of structural funds on the regional growth rates
(Garc´ıa-Mila´ and McGuire, 2001; Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2007). Moreover,
in some cases the findings are conditioned on certain aspects. Rodriguez-
Pose and Fratesi (2004) conclude that only structural fund expenditures for
education and investment have a positive effect in the medium run, whereas
expenditures for agriculture do not. Ederveen, Gorter, de Mooij, and Nahuis
(2002) condition the key results on the assumptions of the convergence model.
Assuming that all regions finally catch up to the same level, they find posi-
tive evidence. By contrast, assuming that the convergence process is limited
to convergence within countries, they do not find a positive effect. Finally,
Puigcerver-Pen˜alver (2004) find the structural funds to have a positive im-
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pact on the growth rates for the period 1989–1993, but not for 1993–1999.
The literature review clarifies that there are a number of issues requiring
further investigation. First of all, the current literature has concentrated on
the time period before 2000. Hence, the effectiveness of the last Financial
Perspective 2000–2006 has not yet been evaluated. Moreover, the existing
papers have not investigated in detail the impact of the different Objectives
defined by the European Commission. In addition, some studies do not dis-
tinguish between payments and commitments. Furthermore, one might crit-
icise that the time lag of the effectiveness has not yet been analysed. Finally,
some papers are limited concerning the econometric approaches applied, so
that the robustness of the results might be questioned. In this respect, the
aspect of endogeneity and the potential bias resulting from spatial correla-
tion have hardly been controlled for (one notably exception is Dall’erba and
Le Gallo, 2007).
3 Econometric challenges
When estimating the effects of structural funds payments on economic growth
at the regional level, several methodological challenges have to be considered.
First of all, there is the danger of a biased estimate due to reverse causal-
ity. The allocation criteria of the structural funds are likely to be correlated
with the dependent variable “economic growth”. First and foremost, the
allocation of structural funds is based on the ratio of the regional GDP (in
PPS) and the EU-wide GDP. If this ratio is below 75 per cent, the region
is a so-called “Objective 1” region, implying that this region is eligible to
the highest transfers relative to GDP. Furthermore, allocation depends, in-
ter alia, on the regional unemployment rate, the employment structure, and
the population density. The effective payments by the Commission to the
regions depend on the regions’ abilities to initiate and co-finance projects.
This ability may depend on the wealth of the regions.
Second, there may be endogeneity of the structural funds, i.e., there may
be unobserved variables simultaneously affecting structural funds payments
and growth. If these are constant over time they are eliminated by fixed-
effects or by first differences. If these unobserved variables are not constant,
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methods such as instrumental variable (IV) estimators are necessary.
Third, there may be regional spillover effects. For example, structural
funds payments may increase one region’s growth which, in turn, may affect
neighbouring regions’ growth rates positively. If these spillover effects cannot
be separated from the “original” impulse, the estimated effect of structural
funds payments might be biased.
In order to deal with the first and the second problem, an IV estimator
combined with fixed-effects or first-differences seems to be the right choice.
However, no suitable external IV is available. Hence, identification will be
based on internal instruments via a two-step system GMM estimator (Blun-
dell and Bond, 1998). The third problem is addressed by applying a spatial
regression model, where we use a weight matrix containing information on
the k -nearest neighbours of each region in order to remove spatial autocor-
relation as recently proposed inter alia by Anselin, Florax, and Rey (2004).
Obviously, given the available data, we are not able to deal with all prob-
lems mentioned above simultaneously. However, by applying different meth-
ods, we hope to get a general idea about the methodological problems and
the range of the true effect of structural funds payments on growth.
4 Variables and data
Unfortunately, data availability at the European regional level is limited with
regard to both structural funds data and economic variables. Consequently,
the choice of the time period of investigation and the choice of regions are
pre-determined by the availability of suitable data.
The annual reports on structural funds published by the European Com-
mission (1995, 1996a,b, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) only comprise regional com-
mitments / payments for the period 1994–1999. Unfortunately, since 2000,
these reports only contain data at the country level. However, we were given
access to the annual regional payments and commitments by the European
Commission in Brussels. This dataset contains payments for the time period
2000–2006 that has, to the best of our knowledge, not yet been analysed
before.
It has to be taken into account that only payments of the period 2000–
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2006 are available in this dataset, i.e. remaining payments from the previous
Financial Perspective 1994–1999 are excluded. In order to avoid an under-
estimation of the total amount of European structural funds, we allocate
those commitments from the Financial Perspective 1994–1999 that have not
been paid out by 1999 to the years 2000 and 2001. In doing so, we calcu-
late the residual amount of structural funds by subtracting the aggregated
payments for 1994–1999 from the aggregated commitments for 1994–1999.
Assuming that all commitments finally lead to payments and taking into ac-
count the N+2 rule, which basically states that payments can be called up
two years after they have been allocated as commitments, we allocate the
remaining amount at a rate of 2:1 to the years 2000 and 2001, respectively.
In our analysis we concentrate on Objective 1, 2 and 3 payments. These
have different aims which can be classified under three topics: (i) The highest
share of structural funds payments (approximately two-third of total struc-
tural funds) are spent for Objective 1 projects, which shall promote develop-
ment in less prosperous regions. The remaining part is shared almost equally
among (ii) Objective 2 payments for regions in structural decline and (iii)
Objective 3 payments to support education and employment policies (for a
more detailed survey see Table 2 in the Appendix). As these Objectives
each consisted of two Objectives in the Financial Perspective 1994–1999, we
add the Objective 6 payments to Objective 1, the Objective 5b payments
to Objective 2 and the Objective 4 payments to Objective 3. Moreover, we
are only interested in the impact of structural funds on the regional growth
rates, so that we only use those payments that we are able to allocate to the
regional level. Therefore, multi-regional programmes aiming at the national
level (e.g. structural funds expenditures for education) are not considered.
As a consequence, we can extend the period of investigation to the time
period 1995–2006.
To present an overview of the regional distribution of the payments of
structural funds, Figures 1–3 show quantile maps of the structural funds
for each Objective. These maps display the distribution of the funds over
nine intervals by assigning the same number of values to each of the nine
categories in the map. The payments are expressed in per cent of nominal
GDP and are displayed for the two subperiods (1995–1999, 2000–2005) that
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mainly correspond to the two previous Financial Perspectives, as well as for
the entire time period of observation (1995–2005). The darker the area, the
higher the share of the region’s payments of structural funds per GDP. The
figures show that Ireland, Eastern Germany, Greece and Spain benefit most
from Objective 1 payments, whereas France, the UK and Northern Spain
show particularly high gains from Objective 2 payments. The payments of
Objective 3 have a similar regional distribution pattern to those of Objective
2. Finally, the bottom right corner of the panel shows the distribution pattern
of the sum of Objective 1, 2 and 3 payments. As this pattern is clearly
similar to that of Objective 1 payments, it reveals that Objective 1 payments
comprise the largest share of total structural funds.
Moreover, Figure 4 displays the distribution pattern of the GDP per
capita variable, showing darker areas to indicate regions wealthier compared
to the EU-15 average. Following the logic of the European Cohesion Policy
to reduce disparities among the European regions, regions with a lower GDP
relative to the EU average should receive more structural funds, enabling
these countries to catch up. A comparison of Figure 4 with Figures 1–3
indicates that the real GDP per capita variable is a good proxy for Objective
1, but a rather bad proxy for Objective 2 and 3 payments. Furthermore, it
becomes clear that the receivers of Objective 1 payments often do not receive
an equally large sum from Objectives 2 and 3 and vice versa.
The economic data we use is taken from the Regio database by Eurostat.
Due to recent modifications in the accounting standards (from the Euro-
pean System of Accounting (ESA) 1979 to ESA 1995), we only use variables
available in ESA 1995.
For the spatial econometrics analysis, we were given access to the Gisco
Eurostat dataset containing spherical coordinates measured in latitudes and
longitudes of the European Union and of the candidate countries (see Eu-
rostat, 2007). We adjust the data according to the selection of our dataset
which comprises 124 NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 regions. As mentioned above,
the selection of NUTS regions is mostly predetermined by the allocation of
structural funds.1 For a detailed description of the choice of the NUTS level,
1There are only six regions for which we have structural payments, for which, however,
the control variables are missing (see Appendix section A).
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see section A of the Appendix. Furthermore, all variables are described in
Table 3 in the appendix.
5 Empirical analyses
This section presents the econometric analysis of the paper by using the new
panel dataset for the time period 1995–2005 and by addressing the method-
ological challenges discussed above. Beginning with the “classical” panel
regression approaches (Least Square Dummy Variable estimator (LSDV),
Newey and West, Prais-Winsten, system GMM) in section 5.1, the influence
of spatial correlation is investigated in greater detail in section 5.2. Finally,
section 5.3 comprises further robustness checks.
5.1 “Classical” panel regression approaches
Derived from a neoclassical Solow-Swan-type growth model (Solow, 1956;
Swan, 1956) and similar to the empirical approach of Ederveen, de Groot,
and Nahuis (2006) and Ba¨hr (2008),2 we estimate the following growth model:
ln(yi,t)− ln(yi,t−1) = β0 + β1 ln(yi,t−1) + β2 ln(invi,t−1) + β3 ln(innovi,t−1)
+ β4 (ni,t−1 + g + δ) + β5 ln(sfi,t−1) + µi + λt + ui,t
(1)
where the subscript i = 1, ..., 124 denotes the region and t indicates the time
index of our sample ranging from 1995–2005. Moreover, yi,t is the log of GDP
per capita (in PPS) of region i at time t, invi,t−1 indicates the gross fixed
capital formation (in % of nominal GDP) and innovi,t−1 is the number of
patents per million inhabitants. ni,t−1 is the population growth rate, g and δ
stand for the technological progress and the time discount factor. Similar to
Mankiw, Romer, and Weill (1992), we assume that δ and g are independent
of time and region and jointly amount to 5%. sfi,t−1 are the payments of
structural funds per GDP. In this case, we analyse the growth impact of
Objective 1, 2 and 3 payments as well as the total sum of Objective 1, 2
2However, in contrast to our analysis, Ederveen, de Groot, and Nahuis (2006) and Ba¨hr
(2008) use country data.
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and 3 payments. As we are interested in the regional growth effect and as
it is hardly possible to attribute national structural policy payments to the
regional level, we exclude so called multiregional programmes. Finally, we
include fixed-region effects (µi) as well as fixed (annual) time effects (λt),
while ui,t is the i.i.d. error term of the specification. The summary statistics
and the correlation matrix comprising all variables are listed in Tables 4 and
5.
Unfortunately, data availability of our explanatory variables is limited at
the regional level. There are, to the best of our knowledge, no high-quality
education data like those proposed at the country level by De La Fuente and
Dome´nech (2006), Barro and Lee (2001) or Cohen and Soto (2007). Hence,
we must assume that education is proxied by the innovation variable (number
of patents per million inhabitants). To test for robustness, we also ran the
regressions using the number of hightech innovations per million inhabitants.
However, the results did not change substantially.
In order to increase the robustness of our results and due to the great
influence of the estimation procedure, we estimate our model with various
econometric approaches, beginning with a LSDV estimator. We proceed by
controlling for serial and spatial correlation and finally end up with a system
GMM approach as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) in order to control
for endogeneity.
Furthermore, we distinguish between Objective 1, 2, and 3 and the sum
of Objectives 1, 2, and 3 payments and analyse in greater detail the impact
of time lags. It may be argued that structural funds projects, such as infras-
tructure investments, only become effective after some time lag. Thus, we
include the structural funds variable into the regression equation (1) not only
with a one year lag but we use up to five lags; i.e., the regression includes the
following term
∑5
i=1 ln(sfi,t−i). Due to multicollinearity the coefficients and
standards errors of the structural funds variable cannot be interpreted if the
variable is included into the regression with several lags. As a consequence,
we calculate the sum of coefficients (SF joint significance (sum)) and test
with a simple Wald test whether this sum is statistically different from zero
(SF joint signif. (p-value)).
The regression results displayed in Tables 5–24 are mostly consistent with
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the predictions of the neoclassical growth theory. We find – independently of
the empirical estimation approach – that the initial GDP variable is negative
and strongly significant in the most cases. In empirical investigations for
longer time periods (e.g. cross-section estimations for 20–100 years as can
be found in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004) or for several 5-year averages as
shown in Ederveen, de Groot, and Nahuis (2006)), the lagged initial GDP
variable gives evidence for the conditional beta convergence, i.e., in control-
ling for other explanatory variables, this variable indicates whether poorer
regions are likely to catch-up with richer ones. Note that from theoretical
considerations this is only valid for more or less similar economies on their
convergence pathes. This condition might be fulfilled as our sample con-
sists of a sample of Western European regions. However, the time period of
investigation is too short to derive solid predictions about the convergence
process. Nevertheless, the initial GDP is an important control variable in
our panel.
Furthermore, the investment variable is – apart from certain system GMM
specifications – positive throughout the estimation approaches and in many
cases it is statistically significant. The coefficients of the population growth
rate follow the predictions of the Solow growth model, as it is negative and,
in most cases statistically significant. Finally, the proxy for education, the
innovation variable, is positive but, with a few exceptions, it is only significant
in the system GMM specifications.
The key variable of interest, however, is the structural funds variable. To
start with, we first run the regression with a restricted growth model ex-
cluding the structural funds variable. The results in Tables 5–9 are in line
with the neoclassical growth predictions. We then successively add the pay-
ments of structural funds beginning with a lag of one year up to a five-year
lagged variable. Concerning the estimation method, we begin with the LSDV
estimator using White-Huber heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, fol-
lowed by two estimation approaches controlling for serial correlation (Newey
and West (1987) and Prais-Winsten). Subsequently, we adjust the standard
errors for heteroskedasticity, serial and spatial correlation as proposed by
Driscoll and Kraay (1998). Finally, we run two-step system GMM regres-
sions following Blundell and Bond (1998) in order to control for endogeneity.
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Beginning with the results of the LSDV approach (Table 6), we find
a positive and significant impact of structural funds on economic growth.
However, the positive impact appears with a lag of two years and it is only
significant up to a lag of four years, i.e., it is not statistically significant with
a lag of five years (column (6)).
The LSDV approach assumes that all explanatory variables are strictly
exogenous and that the error term is not serially correlated. The latter as-
sumption affects the efficiency of the estimator and it is checked with the
Wooldridge test of first-order autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2002). According
to the Wooldridge test, the H0 hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation
can be rejected (Table 6). As a consequence, using the approach proposed
by Newey and West (1987), standard errors are specified as being robust
not only to heteroskedasticity but also to first-order autocorrelation. The
results displayed in Table 7 show that the standard errors of the structural
funds variable are slightly increased in most cases, however, the significance
levels hardly change. Moreover, we also use the Prais-Winsten transfor-
mation matrix to transform the AR(1) disturbances in the error term into
serially-uncorrelated classical errors. Similarly, this leads to slightly reduced
coefficients of the structural funds variable while the overall results remain
very similar to those of the LSDV regressions (Table 8). The structural funds
variable is now significant from the first to the fourth lag.
Moreover, we repeat the analysis using standard errors that are robust to
general forms of spatial dependence. Our set of regions is a non-random sam-
ple, which is possibly subject to common influences affecting our variables
of interest. Thus, we estimate standard errors employing a non-parametric
covariance matrix estimation procedure as proposed by Driscoll and Kraay
(1998) (for a recent discussion, see Hoechle, 2007). The results displayed
in Table 9 again strengthen our previous findings. The coefficients of the
structural fund variable are still positive and are now highly significant, in-
dependently of the number of lags included.
Finally, as discussed in section 3, our results might be biased due to en-
dogeneity of the explanatory variables. In order to allow for the endogeneity
problem, we estimate equation (1) using the two-step system GMM estimator
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), assuming that the GDP, the struc-
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tural funds, and the gross fixed capital formation variables are endogenous,
while only the population growth rate, the number of patents per million in-
habitants, and the time dummies are assumed to be strictly exogenous.3 The
standard errors are finite-sample-adjusted using the approach by Windmei-
jer (2005). In order to guarantee a parsimonious use of instruments, we do
not use more instruments than number of regions included in our regression.
However, there is a trade-off. On the one hand, adding more instruments
raises the validity of the instruments, i.e., the probability of accepting the
null hypothesis of the Hansen test is increased. On the other hand, using
too many instruments can overfit instrumented variables (Roodman, 2007),
reduce the power properties of the Hansen test Bowsher (2002) and lead to
a downward-bias in two-step standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005).
We approach this trade-off by stepwise reducing the upper limit of the
lags of the instrumented endogenous variables. We proceed from general-
to-specific. We start with an upper lag limit of ten and reduce the number
of lags as far as possible. This is done in accordance with the Hansen test
of over-identifying restrictions, i.e., its null hypothesis which states that the
instruments are not correlated with the residuals, must not be significant.
Hence, we end up with an upper limit of lags equal to seven, i.e., in all spe-
cifications we instrument the endogenous variables with its own lags and we
limit the maximum lag length to seven in order to guarantee a parsimonious
use of instruments. As a consequence, in some cases using up to six lags
leads to the H0 of the Hansen test being rejected. Note that this approach
is rather conservative concerning the maximum number of instruments used.
Table 10 reports the p-values of the Hansen tests as well as the tests for the
first- and second-order serial correlation. With the exception of the restricted
model excluding the structural funds variable (column (1) of Tables 6–10),
the Hansen test does not reject the H0 and thus confirms the validity of our
instruments. Moreover, the H0 of no first-order serial correlation is rejected
(AR(1) (p-value)), while it is not rejected for the H0 of no second-order serial
correlation (AR(2) (p-value)). As a consequence, these test statistics indicate
that the model is correctly specified.
3The two-step system GMM regressions are implemented in Stata with the help of xtabond2
following Roodman (2006).
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Concerning the main variable of interest, the structural funds variable,
Table 10 provides clear evidence that the structural funds have a positive
and significant impact on growth independent of the number of lags used.
We repeat this estimation procedure using the payments of structural
funds of Objective 2 (Tables 11–15), 3 (Tables 16–20), and the total sum of
Objectives 1, 2, and 3 (21–25) instead. The results reveal stable results for
all explanatory variables corresponding to the findings presented above. At
the same time, there are clear differences concerning the single Objectives.
Our results indicate that apart from the system GMM specifications Objec-
tive 2 payments are statistically significant. However, they have a negative
impact on growth. Furthermore, the Objective 3 payments have a negative
coefficient, which is, however, not always statistically significant. Finally,
apart from a few exceptions the total sum of structural funds coefficients are
positive, but they are only significant if we use structural funds payments
lagged by two years.
5.2 Spatial analysis
The results of our “classical” panel regression approaches might be biased,
because apart from adopting the standard errors according to the Driscoll
and Kraay (1998) approach, we neglect any sort of spatial correlation. Hence,
one might argue that part of our significant results are explained by regional
spillover effects. Moreover, in our sample of 124 Western European regions,
those regions which are located next to each other might disclose a stronger
spatial dependence than regions at a greater distance.
In order to take these considerations into account, we apply spatial econo-
metric techniques, where the key task is to specify a weight matrix W con-
taining information about the connectivity between regions. This square
matrix has N rows / columns corresponding to our sample of 124 regions.
Its diagonal consists of zeros, whereas each wij specifies the way region i is
spatially connected to region j. To standardise the external influence upon
each region, the weight matrix is normalised such that the elements amount
to one. We follow the approach by Le Gallo and Ertur (2003) and Ertur and
Koch (2006) and use a weight matrix consisting of the k-nearest neighbours
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computed from the great circle distance between region centroids.4 This
weight matrix is purely based on geographical distance, which has the big
advantage that exogeneity of geographical distance is unambiguous. Gener-
ally, the k-nearest neighbours weight matrix W (k) is defined as follows:
W (k) =

w∗ij(k) = 0 if i = j





w∗ij(k) = 0 if dij > di(k)
where w∗ij is an element of the unstandardised weight matrix W and wij is
an element of the standardised weight matrix, di(k) is smallest distance of
the kth order between regions i and j such that each region i has exactly k
neighbours. Following Ertur and Koch (2006), we set k = 10.5
Generally speaking, there are two possibilities to integrate this weight ma-
trix into the regression model. One can either include a spatially-weighted
dependent variable (the so-called “spatial lag model”) or a spatially auto-
correlated error (“spatial error model”) into the regression model. We follow
the first route and estimate the following model, which includes the sample
of 123 regions:





+ β2 ln(invi,t−1) + β3 ln(innovi,t−1)
+ β4 (ni,t−1 + g + δ) + β5 ln(sfi,t−1) + µi + λt + ui,t
(2)
Apart from the inclusion of the lagged and spatially-weighted dependent
variable as an independent variable, the selection of variables remains the
same as in equation (1).
4We use the Matlab toolbox “Arc Mat” (LeSage and Pace, 2004) to determine the centroids
of the polygons (regions) expressed in decimal degrees. These are converted to lattitude
and longitude coordinates and listed in Table 26. The 10 nearest neighbours of each region
are then calculated with the help of the Spatial Statistics Toolbox 2.0 (Pace, 2003).
5For example, the elements of the row / column vector of the weight matrix (W ) for the
region (i) “Region de Bruxelles-capitale” (be) are all zeros with the exception of the ten
nearest neighbours (be2, be3, fr10, fr21, fr22, fr30, fr41, nl2, nl3 and nl4) whose elements
are 0.1.
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Generally, including a spatially-lagged dependent variable into a panel
fixed effects model generates an endogeneity problem because the spatially-
weighted dependent variable is correlated with the disturbance term (Elhorst,
2009). In order to control for this simultaneity, the following results are
based on a fixed effects spatial lag setup using the maximum likelihood (ML)
estimator by Elhorst (2004). Unfortunately, it is currently not possible to
estimate a spatial lag model and simultaneously to control for endogeneity
of other independent control variables, e.g. within a system GMM approach.
The reason for this is that introducing a spatial weight matrix creates a non-
zero log-Jacobian transformation from the disturbances of the model to the
dependent variable, while the system GMM procedure by Blundell and Bond
(1998) is based on the assumption of no Jacobian term involved.6
The results are reported in Tables 27–30. One indicator which tests if
spatial effects are present is given by the coefficient of the weight matrix (ρ).
The results show that ρ is positive throughout and highly significant. Fur-
thermore, it becomes clear that the use of the spatial weight matrix slightly
decreases the coefficients of the explanatory variables. Thus, it emerges that
the explanatory power of these variables that was attributed to their in-region
value, is really due to the neighbouring locations, which is now allowed for by
the coefficient of the spatially lagged dependent variable. Generally, the re-
sults of the coefficients again follow the neoclassical growth predictions. We
find a negative and significant impact of initial GDP and population growth.
The investment variable has a positive and predominantly significant impact
on the GDP growth rate. Only the innovation variable switches signs as it
is now negative.
Most importantly, the results confirm our previous conclusions concerning
the effectiveness of the single Objective payments. The results show a positive
and in most cases significant impact of Objective 1 payments. Similarly,
the total sum of Objectives 1, 2 and 3 has a positive impact. In contrast,
Objective 2 and 3 payments have a negative impact on growth.
6We thank James LeSage for this helpful advice.
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5.3 Further robustness checks
One might argue that the results presented above are influenced by the noise
of the annual growth rate, e.g. resulting from business cycle effects. As
our time period of investigation is rather short due to data availability, we
cannot follow, e.g., Islam (1995), and use 5-year averages, as this would
reduce our sample to two periods only. Furthermore, we do not wish to
rely on a simple cross-section approach, as the unobservable time-invariant
effects could not be cancelled out then. Against the background of our simple
neoclassical growth model, this might lead to biased estimates. Instead,
we re-run our regressions using 2-year, 3-year, and 4-year averages, thereby
reducing our total number of periods to 5, 3, and 2.7 Of course, we then
have to reduce the maximum number of lags according to the dataset used,
i.e., we use structural funds payments with lags of up to four periods in the
2-year dataset (corresponding to a maximum time lag of 8-years), whereas
we only use payments with lags of two periods in the dataset comprising
3-year-averages and we restrict on payments with one period lag with regard
to the dataset including 4-year-averages.
In most cases, the results of the Wooldridge test do not show any evidence
of serial correlation. Hence, we stick to the LSDV approach. Analogously
to the previous subsections, we first implement the results for the restricted
model, i.e., we exclude structural funds from our regression equation in col-
umn (1) of Tables 31, 33 and 34. We then list the estimation results for the
Objective 1, 2, 3, and the total sum of Objective 1, 2 and 3 payments.
The results are reported in Tables 31–34. Once again, the control vari-
ables are mostly in line with the predictions of the Solow model.8 Focussing
on the structural funds payments, we also find confirming evidence for our
7To be more precise, in order to generate the averaged datasets we need twelve time
periods, whereas our original dataset only covers the period 1995–2005 with T equals
eleven. Hence, the averaged datasets are generated between 1994–2005, whereas the last
period is shorter, since data for 1994 is not available.
8The results show that regardless of which dataset is used, we find a negative and strongly
significant impact of the initial GDP variable. At the same time, the investment and
the innovation variable are largely positive but they are not always statistically different
from zero. Finally, we find robust empirical evidence that the population growth rate
plus 0.05 has a negative impact on growth.
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main results. The Objective 1 payments still show positive, significant co-
efficients using the 2-year averaged dataset.9 Furthermore, the Objective 1
coefficients are positive but not significant using the 3- and 4-years averaged
datasets. We find that the Objective 2 variable still negatively influences the
growth rate even though it is not significant in all cases. There are clear-cut
results for the Objective 3 payments, which, regardless of the dataset, do
have a significant and negative impact. Finally, the total sum of Objectives
1, 2, and 3 show mostly positive but not significant coefficients.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the growth effects of European structural
funds payments at the regional level. Using a new panel dataset of 124
NUTS regions for the time period 1995–2005, we extend the current literature
by (i) extending the time period of investigation to the years 1995–2005,
(ii) using more precise measures of structural funds, and by (iii) comparing
the robustness of our results by means of various econometric panel data
techniques.
Within the framework of the “classical” panel regression approaches we
find empirical evidence that the effectiveness of structural funds in promoting
growth is strongly dependent on which Objective is analysed. We find that
Objective 1 payments in particular have a positive and statistically significant
impact on the regions’ growth rates. By contrast, payments of Objective 2
and 3 have a negative and, in many cases, significant impact on growth.
Finally, investigating the total sum of Objectives 1, 2, and 3 indicates a
positive impact, which is, however, not significant independently of the panel
method used. Moreover, our results show that time lags plays a key role in
influencing the effectiveness. We find that the growth impact does not appear
immediately, but that it occurs with a time lag of approximately two to three
years.
These results survive when controlling for heteroskedasticity, serial and
spatial correlation as well as for endogeneity. In particular, using a spatial
9Only in the case of structural funds payments using a 3-years lag, the coefficient is not
statistically different from zero.
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panel approach, we find that regional spillovers do have a significant impact
on the regional growth rates independently of which Objective and time lag
is analysed. Most importantly, the spatial panel estimations confirm our
previous results concerning the effectiveness of single Objectives.
Finally, the robustness of our results is strengthened by our sensitivity
analysis. We re-run our regressions using a 2-, 3-, and 4-years averaged
dataset. However, the substantive results remain unchanged.
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Appendix
A Construction of the dataset
This section illustrates in more detail the construction of our database. The
European regions are classified by the European Commission into three
different groups called “Nomenclature des unite´s territoriales statistiques”
(NUTS). These units refer to the country level (NUTS-0) and to three lower
subdivisions (NUTS-1, NUTS-2 and NUTS-3) which are classified according
to the size of population. Our dataset consists of both NUTS-1 and NUTS-
2 regions. In order to guarantee the highest degree of transparency, this
section lists the abbreviations of the NUTS code in brackets following the
classifications of the European Commission (2007).
The choice of the NUTS level follows the data availability of structural
funds payments. Generally, we try to use data on NUTS-2 level whenever
possible. This is the case for France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and
Sweden. However, there are some countries (e.g. Germany) where we have
to use NUTS-1 level because the annual reports do not contain more detailed
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information. Moreover, in other countries, there is no clear-cut distinction in
the sense that in the annual reports the structural funds are partly allocated
to the NUTS-1 and partly to the NUTS-2 level. Finally, the annual reports
of structural funds for 1995 and 1996 (European Commission, 1996b, 1997)
for some countries only contain data at the NUTS-1 level. Consequently, we
chose the NUTS-1 level for Austria, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom.
For Denmark and Luxembourg, subdivisions do not exist, so that NUTS-
0, NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 codes are the same. We regard those cases as NUTS-
2 regions. In Ireland the labels of NUTS-0 and NUTS-1 level are identical,
so that we classify Ireland as a NUTS-1 region.
Please note that we did not consider the overseas regions of France (De´-
partments d’outre-mer (fr9) consisting of Gudeloupe (fr91), Martinique (fr92),
Guyane (fr93) and Re´union (fr94)), Portugal (Regiao Autonoma dos Acores
(pt2, pt20), Regiao Autonoma da Madeira (pt3, pt30)), and Spain (Canarias
(es7, es70)).
As a consequence, our dataset consists of 130 NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 re-
gions for which we have structural funds payments. However, we have to ex-
clude six regions for which the economic control variables of Eurostat are not
completely available. These regions are Saarland (dec0), Ionia Nisia (gr22),
Voreio Aigaio (gr41), Ciudad Auto´noma de Ceuta (es63), Ciudad Auto´noma
de Melilla (es64) and Luxembourg (lu). Thus, our dataset consists of the
following 124 NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 regions:
Belgium (3 NUTS-1 regions): Region de Bruxelles-capitale (be1), Vlaams
Gewest (be2), Re´gion Wallonne (be3);
Denmark (1 NUTS-2 region): Denmark (dk);
Germany (15 NUTS-1 regions): Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (de1), Bayern (de2),
Berlin (de3), Brandenburg (de4), Bremen (de5), Hamburg (de6), Hessen (de7),
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (de8), Niedersachsen (de9), Nordrhein-Westfalen (dea),
Rheinland-Pfalz (deb), Sachsen (ded), Sachsen-Anhalt (dee), Schleswig-Holstein
(def), Thu¨ringen (deg);
Greece (11 NUTS-2 regions): Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki (gr11), Ken-
triki Makedonia (gr12), Dytiki Makedonia (gr13), Thessalia (gr14), Ipeiros (gr21),
Dytiki Ellada (gr23), Sterea Ellada (gr24), Peloponnisos (gr25), Attiki (gr30), No-
tio Aigaio (gr42), Kriti (gr43);
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Spain (16 NUTS-2 regions): Galicia (es11), Principado de Asturias (es12),
Cantabria (es13), Pa´ıs Vasco (es21), Comunidad Foral de Navarra (es22), La Ri-
oja (es23), Arago´n (es24), Comunidad de Madrid (es30), Castilla y Leo´n (es41),
Castilla-La Mancha (es42), Extremadura (es43), Catalun˜a (es51), Comunidad de
Valenciana (es52), Illes Balears (es53), Andaluc´ıa (es61), Regio´n de Murcia (es62);
France (22 NUTS-2 regions): Iˆle de France (fr10), Champagne-Ardenne (fr21),
Picardie (fr22), Haute-Normandie (fr23), Centre (fr24), Basse-Normandie (fr25),
Bourgogne (fr26), Nord-Pas-de-Calais (fr30), Lorraine (fr41), Alsace (fr42),
Franche-Comte´ (fr43), Pays-de-la-Loire (fr51), Bretagne (fr52), Poitou-Charentes
(fr53), Aquitaine (fr61), Midi-Pyre´ne´es (fr62), Limousin (fr63), Rhoˆne-Alpes (fr71),
Auvergne (fr72), Languedoc-Roussillon (fr81), Provence-Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur (fr82),
Corse (fr83);
Ireland (1 NUTS-1 region): Irland (ie);
Italy (21 NUTS-2 regions): Piemonte (itc1), Valle d’Aosta/Valle´e d’Aoste
(itc2), Liguria (itc3), Lombardia (itc4), Provincia autonoma Bolzano (itd1), Provin-
cia autonoma Trento (itd2), Veneto (itd3), Friuli-Venezia Giulia (itd4), Emilia-
Romagna (itd5), Toscana (ite1), Umbria (ite2), Marche (ite3), Lazio (ite4),
Abruzzo (itf1), Molise (itf2), Campania (itf3), Puglia (itf4), Basilicata (itf5), Cal-
abria (itf6), Sicilia (itg1), Sardegna (itg2);
The Netherlands (4 NUTS-1 regions): Noord-Nederland (nl1), Oost-Neder-
land (nl2), West-Nederland (nl3), Zuid-Nederland (nl4);
Austria (3 NUTS-1 regions): Osto¨sterreich (at1), Su¨do¨sterreich (at2), West-
o¨sterreich (at3);
Portugal (5 NUTS-2 regions): Norte (pt11), Algarve (pt15), Centro (P)
(pt16), Lisboa (pt17), Alentejo (pt18);
Finland (2 NUTS-1 regions): Manner-Suomi (fi1), A˚land (fi2);
Sweden (8 NUTS-2 regions): Stockholm (se11), O¨stra Mellansverige (se12),
Sm˚aland med o¨arna (se021), Sydsverige (se22), Va¨stsverige (se23), Norra Mel-
lansverige (se31), Mellersta Norrland (se32), O¨vre Norrland (se33);
UK (12 NUTS-1 regions): North East (ukc), North West (ukd), Yorkshire and
the Humber (uke), East Midlands (ukf), West Midlands (ukg), East of England
(ukh), London (uki), South East (ukj), South West (ukk), Wales (ukl), Scotland
(ukm), Northern Ireland (ukn).
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Table 2: Objectives of the structural funds, 1994–2006
1994-1999 2000-2006
Definition share of Definition share of
total SF total SF
Obj. 1: To promote the development and struc-
67.6%
Obj. 1: Supporting development in the
69.7%
tural adjustment of regions whose development less prosperous regions
is lagging behind the rest of the EU
Obj. 6: Assisting the development of sparsely-
0.5%
populated regions (Sweden & Finland only)
Obj. 2: To convert regions seriously affected
11.1%
Obj. 2: To support the economic and
11.5%by industrial decline social conversion of areas experiencing
Obj. 5b: Facilitating the development and
4.9%
structural difficulties
structural adjustment of rural areas
Obj. 3: To combat long-term unemployment &
10.9%
Obj. 3: To support the adaptation and mo-
12.3%
facilitate the integration into working life of dernisation of education, training & employ-
young people & of persons exposed to ex- ment policies in regions not eligible under
clusion from the labour market Obj. 1
Obj. 4: To facilitate the adaptation of workers
to industrial changes and to changes in produc-
tion systems
Source: European Commission.
Table 3: Variables and data sources
Variable Definition Source
Real GDP p.c. growth Real GDP (PPS) per capita
growth rate from t to t-1
Ln real GDP p.c. Ln of real GDP (PPS) p.c.
Eurostat Regio statistics
Ln investment Ln of gross fixed capital
formation, % of nominal GDP
Ln pop. growth Ln of population growth
rate from t to t-1
Ln innovation Ln of patents (per million
inhabitants) (interpolated)
Ln Objective 1 Ln of Objective 1 payments,
% of nominal GDP Data for the period 1994–1999:
European Commission (1995,
1996a, b, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000);
Data for the period 2000–2006
were accessed at the European
Commission in Brussels on 24/25
November 2007
Ln Objective 2 Ln of Objective 2 payments,
% of nominal GDP
Ln Objective 3 Ln of Objective 3 payments,
% of nominal GDP
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 Ln of Objectives 1+2+3
payments, % of nominal GDP
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Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Min. Max. Observations
Dev.
Real GDP p.c. growth overall 0.021 0.031 -0.207 0.255 N = 1300
between 0.011 -0.006 0.060 n = 130
within 0.028 -0.204 0.216 T = 10
Ln real GDP p.c. overall 9.961 0.276 9.248 10.989 N = 1430
between 0.263 9.449 10.839 n = 130
within 0.085 9.612 10.299 T = 11
Ln gross fixed capital overall -1.601 0.344 -3.742 -0.581 N = 1166
formation, %GDP between 0.308 -2.718 -1.024 n = 128
within 0.207 -2.625 -0.693 T = 9.1
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 overall -2.931 0.115 -3.681 -2.488 N = 1484
between 0.092 -3.219 -2.590 n = 129
within 0.070 -3.705 -2.558 T = 11.5
Ln patents (per million overall 3.685 1.618 -3.586 6.715 N = 1067
inhabitants) between 1.521 -1.918 6.095 n = 125
within 0.760 -4.442 5.059 T = 8.5
Ln patents (per million inhab.) overall 3.630 1.648 -3.586 6.715 N = 1118
(interpolated) between 1.513 -1.773 6.095 n = 125
within 0.744 -4.497 5.004 T = 8.9
Ln hightech (per million overall 1.148 2.418 -7.131 5.915 N = 1035
inhabitants) between 2.338 -4.826 5.014 n = 125
within 1.057 -4.478 6.142 T = 8.3
Ln hightech (per million inhab.) overall 1.029 2.474 -7.131 5.915 N = 1104
(interpolated) between 2.307 -4.831 5.014 n = 125
within 1.047 -4.597 6.287 T = 8.8
Ln Obj. 1 payments, overall -16.632 9.536 -26.913 -3.434 N = 1419
%GDP between 9.259 -26.842 -3.821 n = 129
within 2.412 -33.995 -5.508 T = 11
Ln Objective 1 payments overall -10.388 8.032 -26.824 -1.267 N = 1419
including multiregional between 5.815 -23.771 -2.713 n = 129
programmes, %GDP within 5.562 -28.638 0.789 T = 11
Ln Objective 2 payments, overall -14.433 7.874 -26.742 -4.327 N = 1419
%GDP between 7.176 -25.310 -5.828 n = 129
within 3.297 -31.297 -3.231 T = 11
Ln Objective 2 payments overall -12.750 7.724 -26.621 -3.634 N = 1419
including multiregional between 6.716 -25.310 -5.119 n = 129
programmes, %GDP within 3.856 -29.558 1.900 T = 11
Ln Objective 3 payments, overall -17.041 7.957 -26.742 -4.327 N = 1419
%GDP between 5.625 -25.310 -6.679 n = 129
within 5.648 -33.081 -2.278 T = 11
Ln Objective 3 payments overall -11.601 7.356 -26.475 -3.634 N = 1419
including multiregional between 5.918 -25.310 -5.365 n = 129
programmes, %GDP within 4.398 -27.946 2.703 T = 11
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 overall -7.558 4.549 -26.742 -3.434 N = 1419
payments, %GDP between 3.176 -24.306 -3.821 n = 129
within 3.269 -24.921 3.501 T = 11
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 payments overall -5.532 2.403 -25.903 -1.267 N = 1419
payments incl. multi- between 1.573 -10.384 -2.713 n = 129






































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Quantile map, Ln of structural funds payments per GDP,
1995–1999
Objective 1 Objective 2
Objective 3 Objectives 1+2+3
Notes: Own illustration. The payments of structural funds do not include multiregional funding pro-
grammes. The darker the area, the higher the relative share of regions’ payments of structural funds per
GDP.
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Figure 2: Quantile map, Ln of structural funds payments per GDP,
2000–2005
Objective 1 Objective 2
Objective 3 Objectives 1+2+3
Notes: Own illustration. The payments of structural funds do not include multiregional funding pro-
grammes. The darker the area, the higher the relative share of regions’ payments of structural funds per
GDP.
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Figure 3: Quantile map, Ln of structural funds payments per GDP,
1995–2005
Objective 1 Objective 2
Objective 3 Objectives 1+2+3
Notes: Own illustration. The payments of structural funds do not include multiregional funding pro-
grammes. The darker the area, the higher the relative share of regions’ payments of structural funds per
GDP.
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Figure 4: Quantile map, GDP per capita (in PPS), 1995–2005
Source: Own illustration. The darker the area the wealthier is the region compared to the EU-15 average.
Table 6: Objective 1: LSDV Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.176*** -0.179*** -0.232*** -0.280*** -0.366*** -0.553***
(0.0305) (0.0302) (0.0364) (0.0439) (0.0574) (0.0626)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00308 0.00367 0.00564 0.0147*** 0.0263* 0.0438**
(0.00375) (0.00376) (0.00421) (0.00521) (0.0135) (0.0189)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0130 -0.00703 -0.0180 -0.0262* -0.0305** -0.0437**
(0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0141) (0.0153) (0.0201)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00137 0.00149 0.00159 0.00124 0.00325 0.00335
(0.00204) (0.00203) (0.00227) (0.00284) (0.00292) (0.00317)
Ln Objective 1 (t-1) 0.000875 8.44e-05 -0.000262 -5.51e-05 -0.000119
(0.000532) (0.000513) (0.000488) (0.000512) (0.000592)
Ln Objective 1 (t-2) 0.00113 -4.76e-05 -0.000349 0.000246
(0.000772) (0.000791) (0.000875) (0.000834)
Ln Objective 1 (t-3) 0.00255*** 0.00201* 0.00136*
(0.000942) (0.00114) (0.000707)
Ln Objective 1 (t-4) 0.000459 4.94e-05
(0.000943) (0.000717)
Ln Objective 1 (t-5) 0.000712
(0.00134)
SF joint signif. (sum) 0.00122 0.00224 0.00207 0.00225
SF joint signif. (p-value) 0.0844 0.00931 0.0310 0.138
Observations 1062 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124 124
R-squared 0.361 0.366 0.408 0.442 0.474 0.542
Adj. R-squared 0.353 0.357 0.399 0.432 0.463 0.531
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 7.83e-11
Wooldridge test AR(1) (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: White-Huber heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown.
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Table 7: Objective 1: Newey and West (1987)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.176*** -0.179*** -0.232*** -0.280*** -0.366*** -0.553***
(0.0317) (0.0310) (0.0365) (0.0434) (0.0485) (0.0638)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00308 0.00367 0.00564 0.0147*** 0.0263** 0.0438**
(0.00397) (0.00398) (0.00437) (0.00532) (0.0124) (0.0196)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0130 -0.00703 -0.0180 -0.0262* -0.0305* -0.0437*
(0.0119) (0.0116) (0.0135) (0.0150) (0.0160) (0.0229)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00137 0.00149 0.00159 0.00124 0.00325 0.00335
(0.00204) (0.00202) (0.00228) (0.00280) (0.00280) (0.00292)
Ln Objective 1 (t-1) 0.000875 8.44e-05 -0.000262 -5.51e-05 -0.000119
(0.000556) (0.000418) (0.000486) (0.000475) (0.000547)
Ln Objective 1 (t-2) 0.00113 -4.76e-05 -0.000349 0.000246
(0.000728) (0.000640) (0.000844) (0.000750)
Ln Objective 1 (t-3) 0.00255** 0.00201 0.00136*
(0.00106) (0.00129) (0.000723)
Ln Objective 1 (t-4) 0.000459 4.94e-05
(0.000841) (0.000712)
Ln Objective 1 (t-5) 0.000712
(0.00130)
SF joint signif. (sum) 0.00122 0.00224 0.00207 0.00225
SF joint signif. (p-value) 0.0983 0.0175 0.0188 0.139
Observations 1062 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124 124
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wald test Reg. Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Serially-adjusted standard errors according to Newey and West (1987) are reported in parentheses; * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant, region and time dummies are not shown.
Table 8: Objective 1: Prais-Winsten
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.168*** -0.170*** -0.214*** -0.253*** -0.334*** -0.590***
(0.0300) (0.0296) (0.0353) (0.0425) (0.0543) (0.0601)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00277 0.00331 0.00558 0.0155*** 0.0269** 0.0454**
(0.00370) (0.00371) (0.00417) (0.00541) (0.0135) (0.0183)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0143 -0.00852 -0.0210* -0.0289** -0.0347** -0.0413**
(0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0138) (0.0151) (0.0197)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00131 0.00143 0.00145 0.00104 0.00310 0.00377
(0.00204) (0.00202) (0.00226) (0.00281) (0.00302) (0.00317)
Ln Objective 1 (t-1) 0.000893* 1.62e-05 -0.000255 -7.16e-06 -0.000114
(0.000525) (0.000513) (0.000499) (0.000523) (0.000557)
Ln Objective 1 (t-2) 0.00121 -0.000102 -0.000337 0.000243
(0.000783) (0.000809) (0.000920) (0.000789)
Ln Objective 1 (t-3) 0.00246*** 0.00180 0.00136**
(0.000937) (0.00115) (0.000665)
Ln Objective 1 (t-4) 0.000405 0.000115
(0.000914) (0.000710)
Ln Objective 1 (t-5) 0.000804
(0.00133)
SF joint signif. (sum) 0.00122 0.00210 0.00186 0.00241
SF joint signif. (p-value) 0.0703 0.00692 0.0348 0.114
Observations 1062 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124 124
R-squared 0.479 0.485 0.528 0.563 0.606 0.643
Adj. R-squared 0.402 0.408 0.448 0.476 0.511 0.534
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wald test Reg. Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Serially adjusted standard errors according to the Prais-Winsten method are reported in parentheses; * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant, region and time dummies are not shown.
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Table 9: Objective 1: Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.176** -0.179** -0.232*** -0.280** -0.366*** -0.553***
(0.0773) (0.0759) (0.0870) (0.115) (0.125) (0.108)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00308 0.00367 0.00564 0.0147** 0.0263** 0.0438***
(0.00629) (0.00613) (0.00671) (0.00683) (0.0101) (0.0165)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0130 -0.00703 -0.0180 -0.0262 -0.0305 -0.0437*
(0.0242) (0.0251) (0.0236) (0.0225) (0.0202) (0.0253)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00137 0.00149 0.00159 0.00124 0.00325*** 0.00335*
(0.000930) (0.000945) (0.00125) (0.00145) (0.00116) (0.00182)
Ln Objective 1 (t-1) 0.000875** 8.44e-05 -0.000262 -5.51e-05 -0.000119
(0.000381) (0.000347) (0.000486) (0.000449) (0.000497)
Ln Objective 1 (t-2) 0.00113 -4.76e-05 -0.000349 0.000246
(0.000716) (0.000567) (0.000876) (0.000844)
Ln Objective 1 (t-3) 0.00255*** 0.00201*** 0.00136***
(0.000784) (0.000768) (0.000510)
Ln Objective 1 (t-4) 0.000459 4.94e-05
(0.000444) (0.000419)
Ln Objective 1 (t-5) 0.000712**
(0.000309)
SF joint signif. (sum) 0.00122 0.00224 0.00207 0.00225
SF joint signif. (p-value) 0.0177 3.48e-07 0 0.000921
Observations 1062 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124 124
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and are reported parentheses; * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown.
Table 10: Objective 1: Two-step system GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.0266 -0.0216 -0.0226 -0.0186 -0.0393** -0.0397*
(0.0170) (0.0180) (0.0196) (0.0204) (0.0191) (0.0223)
Ln investment (t-1) -0.00379 -0.00731 -0.00688 -0.000565 0.00196 0.00754
(0.00391) (0.00489) (0.00518) (0.00692) (0.0189) (0.0204)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0167** -0.0314*** -0.0330** -0.0271** -0.0342** -0.0273*
(0.00835) (0.0105) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0145)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00130 0.00543** 0.00534* 0.00621** 0.00525** 0.00420
(0.00208) (0.00254) (0.00302) (0.00272) (0.00249) (0.00349)
Ln Objective 1 (t-1) 0.00120* 0.00215*** 0.00166** 0.00263*** 0.00247**
(0.000624) (0.000829) (0.000659) (0.00101) (0.00108)
Ln Objective 1 (t-2) -0.000991 -0.00117* -0.00187** -0.00170**
(0.000622) (0.000632) (0.000804) (0.000802)
Ln Objective 1 (t-3) 0.000768 0.00165 0.00174
(0.000478) (0.00113) (0.00108)
Ln Objective 1 (t-4) -0.00189 -0.00130
(0.00145) (0.00164)
Ln Objective 1 (t-5) -0.00116
(0.000730)
SF joint signif. (sum) 0.00116 0.00126 0.000525 5.09e-05
SF joint signif. (p-value) 0.0800 0.0829 0.326 0.919
Observations 1062 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124 124
Number of instruments 88 122 123 120 110 97
AR(1) (p-value) 3.81e-09 3.19e-09 4.28e-09 9.95e-09 1.39e-07 2.15e-07
AR(2) (p-value) 0.0897 0.134 0.118 0.298 0.0751 0.0233
Hansen (p-value) 0.00883 0.196 0.226 0.205 0.102 0.0460
Notes: Standard errors are corrected using the approach by Windmeijer (2005) and are listed in parentheses; * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown. Endogenous variables
are real GDP p.c., investment and Obj. 1, while all other variables are assumed to be exogenous. We instrument the
endogenous variables with both its lags and its differenced lags restricting the laglimit to seven in order to prevent that
the number of instruments exceeds the number of regions. Calculations are done with xtabond2 by Roodman (2006).
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Table 11: Objective 2: LSDV Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.176*** -0.227*** -0.275*** -0.371*** -0.581***
(0.0304) (0.0377) (0.0508) (0.0704) (0.0595)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00261 0.00449 0.0130** 0.0216 0.0403**
(0.00375) (0.00428) (0.00521) (0.0136) (0.0181)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0127 -0.0176 -0.0249** -0.0293** -0.0346**
(0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0123) (0.0129) (0.0147)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00124 0.00136 6.90e-05 0.00220 0.00121
(0.00205) (0.00232) (0.00281) (0.00310) (0.00350)
Ln Objective 2 (t-1) -0.000379 -0.000294 -0.000357 -0.000356 -0.000311
(0.000234) (0.000271) (0.000288) (0.000317) (0.000350)
Ln Objective 2 (t-2) 0.000285 0.000393 0.000421 0.000600
(0.000255) (0.000285) (0.000356) (0.000415)
Ln Objective 2 (t-3) -0.00142*** -0.00127*** -0.00149**
(0.000296) (0.000399) (0.000742)
Ln Objective 2 (t-4) -0.000697** -0.00139**
(0.000350) (0.000549)
Ln Objective 2 (t-5) -0.00125**
(0.000500)
SF joint significance (sum) -8.67e-06 -0.00138 -0.00190 -0.00384
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.981 0.0106 0.0151 0.00277
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
R-squared 0.363 0.404 0.440 0.474 0.563
Adj. R-squared 0.354 0.395 0.430 0.464 0.552
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Wooldridge test AR(1) (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: White-Huber heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown.
Table 12: Objective 2: Newey and West (1987)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.176*** -0.227*** -0.275*** -0.371*** -0.581***
(0.0323) (0.0385) (0.0433) (0.0500) (0.0695)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00261 0.00449 0.0130** 0.0216* 0.0403*
(0.00383) (0.00490) (0.00553) (0.0126) (0.0228)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0127 -0.0176 -0.0249* -0.0293** -0.0346*
(0.0138) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0128) (0.0189)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00124 0.00136 6.90e-05 0.00220 0.00121
(0.00196) (0.00238) (0.00277) (0.00318) (0.00374)
Ln Objective 2 (t-1) -0.000379 -0.000294 -0.000357 -0.000356 -0.000311
(0.000246) (0.000272) (0.000321) (0.000365) (0.000438)
Ln Objective 2 (t-2) 0.000285 0.000393 0.000421 0.000600
(0.000251) (0.000246) (0.000320) (0.000398)
Ln Objective 2 (t-3) -0.00142*** -0.00127*** -0.00149**
(0.000254) (0.000352) (0.000669)
Ln Objective 2 (t-4) -0.000697** -0.00139**
(0.000330) (0.000584)
Ln Objective 2 (t-5) -0.00125**
(0.000578)
SF joint significance (sum) -8.67e-06 -0.00138 -0.00190 -0.00384
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.984 0.0169 0.0192 0.0120
Observations 1061 942 825 704 583
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
R-squared 0.268 0.302 0.328 0.347 0.428
Adj. R-squared 0.363 0.404 0.440 0.474 0.563
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Serially-adjusted standard errors according to Newey and West (1987) are reported in parentheses; * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant, region and time dummies are not shown.
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Table 13: Objective 2: Prais-Winsten
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.170*** -0.214*** -0.248*** -0.338*** -0.620***
(0.0300) (0.0370) (0.0488) (0.0632) (0.0565)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00239 0.00445 0.0138** 0.0228* 0.0416**
(0.00372) (0.00425) (0.00538) (0.0134) (0.0175)
Ln pop. Growth (t-1) -0.0137 -0.0198* -0.0286** -0.0345*** -0.0331**
(0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0129) (0.0139)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00120 0.00128 -0.000131 0.00196 0.00183
(0.00205) (0.00231) (0.00278) (0.00325) (0.00347)
Ln Objective 2 (t-1) -0.000355 -0.000252 -0.000290 -0.000229 -0.000344
(0.000271) (0.000292) (0.000319) (0.000348)
Ln Objective 2 (t-2) 0.000245 0.000379 0.000365 0.000606
(0.000256) (0.000282) (0.000353) (0.000422)
Ln Objective 2 (t-3) -0.00147*** -0.00135*** -0.00144**
(0.000297) (0.000418) (0.000724)
Ln Objective 2 (t-4) -0.000747** -0.00147***
(0.000356) (0.000546)
Ln Objective 2 (t-5) -0.00128***
(0.000480)
SF joint significance (sum) -6.95e-06 -0.00138 -0.00196 -0.00394
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.985 0.00801 0.00794 0.00241
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
R-squared 0.478 0.519 0.564 0.613 0.661
Adj. R-squared 0.401 0.438 0.477 0.519 0.556
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Wald test Region Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Serially adjusted standard errors according to the Prais-Winsten method are reported in parentheses; * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant, region and time dummies are not shown.
Table 14: Objective 2: Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.176** -0.227** -0.275** -0.371*** -0.581***
(0.0761) (0.0901) (0.120) (0.133) (0.113)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00261 0.00449 0.0130* 0.0216** 0.0403**
(0.00633) (0.00711) (0.00734) (0.0108) (0.0172)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0127 -0.0176 -0.0249 -0.0293** -0.0346**
(0.0234) (0.0215) (0.0186) (0.0116) (0.0139)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00124 0.00136 6.90e-05 0.00220 0.00121
(0.000880) (0.00118) (0.00157) (0.00162) (0.00205)
Ln Objective 2 (t-1) -0.000379 -0.000294 -0.000357 -0.000356 -0.000311
(0.000281) (0.000313) (0.000367) (0.000427) (0.000419)
Ln Objective 2 (t-2) 0.000285 0.000393 0.000421 0.000600
(0.000392) (0.000411) (0.000490) (0.000499)
Ln Objective 2 (t-3) -0.00142*** -0.00127*** -0.00149***
(0.000300) (0.000290) (0.000427)
Ln Objective 2 (t-4) -0.000697 -0.00139*
(0.000447) (0.000716)
Ln Objective 2 (t-5) -0.00125***
(0.000407)
SF joint significance (sum) -8.67e-06 -0.00138 -0.00190 -0.00384
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.986 0.0636 0.0305 1.08e-05
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and are reported parentheses; * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown.
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Table 15: Objective 2: Two-step system GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.0341** -0.0346** -0.0351** -0.0276* -0.0259
(0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0175)
Ln investment (t-1) -0.00724* -0.00626 -0.00185 -0.00264 -0.00363
(0.00388) (0.00404) (0.00505) (0.0155) (0.0190)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) 0.0220** 0.0211** 0.0178* 0.0154 0.0130
(0.00894) (0.00870) (0.00915) (0.00965) (0.0110)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00296* 0.00278 0.00384* 0.00335 0.00308
(0.00175) (0.00180) (0.00202) (0.00219) (0.00269)
Ln Objective 2 (t-1) -0.000457 -0.000975** -0.000535 -0.000683 -0.000541
(0.000405) (0.000417) (0.000459) (0.000508) (0.000540)
Ln Objective 2 (t-2) 0.000705** 0.000791*** 0.000642* 0.000712*
(0.000315) (0.000303) (0.000336) (0.000384)
Ln Objective 2 (t-3) -0.000679*** -0.000764*** -0.000778**
(0.000239) (0.000230) (0.000385)
Ln Objective 2 (t-4) 0.000283 8.09e-05
(0.000378) (0.000552)
Ln Objective 2 (t-5) 3.45e-05
(0.000515)
SF joint significance (sum) -0.000270 -0.000423 -0.000523 -0.000492
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.535 0.369 0.267 0.351
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
Number of instruments 122 123 120 110 97
AR(1) (p-value) 4.86e-09 3.09e-08 9.17e-08 1.59e-06 5.76e-07
AR(2) (p-value) 0.135 0.138 0.398 0.197 0.0782
Hansen (p-value) 0.184 0.187 0.156 0.0827 0.0260
Notes: Standard errors are corrected using the approach by Windmeijer (2005) and are listed in parentheses; * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown. Endogenous variables
are real GDP p.c., investment and Obj. 2, while all other variables are assumed to be exogenous. We instrument the
endogenous variables with both its lags and its differenced lags restricting the laglimit to seven in order to prevent that
the number of instruments exceeds the number of regions. Calculations are done with xtabond2 by Roodman (2006).
Table 16: Objective 3: LSDV Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP PPS p.c. (t-1) -0.170*** -0.218*** -0.273*** -0.356*** -0.559***
(0.0302) (0.0379) (0.0512) (0.0706) (0.0590)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00204 0.00359 0.0100** 0.0174 0.0316*
(0.00369) (0.00417) (0.00504) (0.0134) (0.0182)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0186* -0.0251** -0.0346** -0.0380** -0.0469***
(0.0109) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0152) (0.0178)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.000649 0.000800 -0.000420 0.00179 0.00192
(0.00208) (0.00233) (0.00278) (0.00305) (0.00332)
Ln Objective 3 (t-1) -0.000561*** -0.000518*** -0.000544*** -0.000518** -0.000732***
(0.000142) (0.000168) (0.000186) (0.000215) (0.000225)
Ln Objective 3 (t-2) -2.90e-05 0.000393* 0.000370* 0.000283
(0.000173) (0.000201) (0.000219) (0.000234)
Ln Objective 3 (t-3) -0.00105*** -0.000933*** -0.00134***
(0.000210) (0.000256) (0.000281)
Ln Objective 3 (t-4) 0.000179 0.000447
(0.000285) (0.000325)
Ln Objective 3 (t-5) -0.00175***
(0.000437)
SF joint significance (sum) -0.000547 -0.00120 -0.000902 -0.00309
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.00484 8.21e-07 0.00280 5.17e-07
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
R-squared 0.370 0.409 0.448 0.478 0.588
Adj. R-squared 0.361 0.400 0.438 0.467 0.578
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 1.75e-08
Wooldridge test (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: White-Huber heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown.
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Table 17: Objective 3: Newey and West (1987)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP PPS p.c. (t-1) -0.170*** -0.218*** -0.273*** -0.356*** -0.559***
(0.0312) (0.0392) (0.0508) (0.0571) (0.0594)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00204 0.00359 0.0100** 0.0174 0.0316*
(0.00388) (0.00431) (0.00509) (0.0124) (0.0188)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0186 -0.0251* -0.0346** -0.0380** -0.0469**
(0.0119) (0.0133) (0.0148) (0.0158) (0.0204)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.000649 0.000800 -0.000420 0.00179 0.00192
(0.00209) (0.00236) (0.00279) (0.00296) (0.00314)
Ln Objective 3 (t-1) -0.000561*** -0.000518*** -0.000544*** -0.000518*** -0.000732***
(0.000139) (0.000165) (0.000178) (0.000193) (0.000211)
Ln Objective 3 (t-2) -2.90e-05 0.000393** 0.000370* 0.000283
(0.000171) (0.000198) (0.000209) (0.000226)
Ln Objective 3 (t-3) -0.00105*** -0.000933*** -0.00134***
(0.000205) (0.000242) (0.000270)
Ln Objective 3 (t-4) 0.000179 0.000447
(0.000259) (0.000303)
Ln Objective 3 (t-5) -0.00175***
(0.000442)
SF joint significance (sum) -0.000547 -0.00120 -0.000902 -0.00309
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.00449 5.84e-07 0.00197 5.83e-07
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 3.07e-10
Wald test Region Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Serially-adjusted standard errors according to Newey and West (1987) are reported in parentheses; * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant, region and time dummies are not shown.
Table 18: Objective 3: Prais-Winsten
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP PPS p.c. (t-1) -0.163*** -0.202*** -0.246*** -0.326*** -0.579***
(0.0298) (0.0371) (0.0493) (0.0641) (0.0573)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00178 0.00334 0.0107** 0.0185 0.0322*
(0.00365) (0.00412) (0.00522) (0.0134) (0.0179)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0195* -0.0272** -0.0374*** -0.0423*** -0.0455**
(0.0109) (0.0122) (0.0137) (0.0152) (0.0176)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.000597 0.000649 -0.000679 0.00153 0.00229
(0.00207) (0.00232) (0.00277) (0.00316) (0.00332)
Ln Objective 3 (t-1) -0.000550*** -0.000474*** -0.000505*** -0.000456** -0.000721***
(0.000141) (0.000168) (0.000188) (0.000217) (0.000222)
Ln Objective 3 (t-2) -9.25e-05 0.000354* 0.000288 0.000284
(0.000174) (0.000207) (0.000232) (0.000233)
Ln Objective 3 (t-3) -0.00103*** -0.000895*** -0.00132***
(0.000207) (0.000268) (0.000280)
Ln Objective 3 (t-4) 0.000109 0.000419
(0.000306) (0.000316)
Ln Objective 3 (t-5) -0.00166***
(0.000434)
SF joint significance (sum) -0.000566 -0.00119 -0.000953 -0.00300
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.00261 2.18e-07 0.00120 1.04e-06
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
R-squared 0.484 0.527 0.567 0.609 0.676
Adj. R-squared 0.408 0.446 0.481 0.515 0.577
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 6.80e-09
Wald test Region Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Serially adjusted standard errors according to the Prais-Winsten method are reported in parentheses; * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant, region and time dummies are not shown.
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Table 19: Objective 3: Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP PPS p.c. (t-1) -0.170** -0.218** -0.273** -0.356*** -0.559***
(0.0739) (0.0887) (0.116) (0.132) (0.110)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00204 0.00359 0.0100 0.0174* 0.0316
(0.00629) (0.00699) (0.00609) (0.0104) (0.0194)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0186 -0.0251 -0.0346* -0.0380** -0.0469***
(0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0193) (0.0158) (0.0160)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.000649 0.000800 -0.000420 0.00179 0.00192
(0.000740) (0.000996) (0.00143) (0.00136) (0.00197)
Ln Objective 3 (t-1) -0.000561*** -0.000518** -0.000544*** -0.000518** -0.000732**
(0.000176) (0.000225) (0.000185) (0.000219) (0.000327)
Ln Objective 3 (t-2) -2.90e-05 0.000393 0.000370 0.000283
(0.000307) (0.000298) (0.000295) (0.000368)
Ln Objective 3 (t-3) -0.00105*** -0.000933*** -0.00134***
(0.000204) (0.000304) (0.000125)
Ln Objective 3 (t-4) 0.000179 0.000447
(0.000496) (0.000347)
Ln Objective 3 (t-5) -0.00175***
(0.000559)
SF joint significance (sum) -0.000547 -0.00120 -0.000902 -0.00309
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.0302 0.000296 0.0189 3.72e-05
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and are reported parentheses; * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown.
Table 20: Objective 3: Two-step system GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP PPS p.c. (t-1) -0.0250** -0.0253** -0.0179 -0.0204 -0.0159
(0.0119) (0.0113) (0.0119) (0.0129) (0.0182)
Ln investment (t-1) -0.00328 -0.00297 0.00259 -0.00358 0.00164
(0.00379) (0.00386) (0.00474) (0.0122) (0.0157)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) 0.0176** 0.0176** 0.0126 0.0133 0.00575
(0.00755) (0.00742) (0.00846) (0.0102) (0.0125)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00296** 0.00325** 0.00395*** 0.00433** 0.00668**
(0.00130) (0.00137) (0.00145) (0.00189) (0.00263)
Ln Objective 3 (t-1) -0.00114*** -0.00104*** -0.000814*** -0.000947*** -0.00149***
(0.000212) (0.000231) (0.000233) (0.000272) (0.000326)
Ln Objective 3 (t-2) -0.000136 9.04e-05 -2.83e-05 -0.000109
(0.000244) (0.000255) (0.000277) (0.000295)
Ln Objective 3 (t-3) -0.000919*** -0.00110*** -0.00133***
(0.000199) (0.000238) (0.000271)
Ln Objective 3 (t-4) 0.000383* 0.000944***
(0.000211) (0.000258)
Ln Objective 3 (t-5) -0.00117***
(0.000335)
SF joint significance (sum) -0.00118 -0.00164 -0.00169 -0.00316
SF joint significance (p-value) 4.88e-07 4.05e-09 1.70e-06 3.61e-09
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
Number of instruments 122 123 120 110 97
AR(1) (p-value) 1.29e-08 2.86e-08 2.05e-07 4.65e-06 5.63e-07
AR(2) (p-value) 0.338 0.153 0.687 0.292 0.273
Hansen (p-value) 0.180 0.194 0.143 0.0670 0.0887
Notes: Standard errors are corrected using the approach by Windmeijer (2005) and are listed in parentheses; * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown. Endogenous variables
are real GDP p.c., investment and Obj. 3, while all other variables are assumed to be exogenous. We instrument the
endogenous variables with both its lags and its differenced lags restricting the laglimit to seven in order to prevent that
the number of instruments exceeds the number of regions. Calculations are done with xtabond2 by Roodman (2006).
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Table 21: Objectives 1+2+3: LSDV Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.177*** -0.237*** -0.281*** -0.370*** -0.574***
(0.0306) (0.0372) (0.0516) (0.0705) (0.0583)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00356 0.00619 0.0140** 0.0257* 0.0439**
(0.00376) (0.00434) (0.00548) (0.0141) (0.0186)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0123 -0.0133 -0.0226* -0.0276** -0.0340**
(0.0108) (0.0115) (0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0158)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00153 0.00161 0.000646 0.00283 0.00254
(0.00204) (0.00228) (0.00283) (0.00297) (0.00343)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-1) 0.000263 0.000308 7.11e-05 0.000212 0.000435
(0.000264) (0.000287) (0.000279) (0.000300) (0.000330)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-2) 0.000772** 0.000848** 0.000708* 0.00126***
(0.000306) (0.000381) (0.000416) (0.000446)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-3) -0.000460 7.99e-06 -0.000605
(0.000434) (0.000707) (0.000742)
Ln Objective2 1+2+3 (t-4) -0.000242 -0.000778*
(0.000477) (0.000471)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-5) -0.000770*
(0.000455)
SF joint significance (sum) 0.00108 0.000459 0.000686 -0.000463
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.0167 0.495 0.506 0.695
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
R-squared 0.362 0.410 0.430 0.465 0.557
Adj. R-squared 0.353 0.401 0.420 0.454 0.546
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Wooldridge test AR(1) (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: White-Huber heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown.
Table 22: Objectives 1+2+3: Newey and West (1987)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.177*** -0.237*** -0.281*** -0.370*** -0.574***
(0.0315) (0.0376) (0.0504) (0.0577) (0.0593)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00356 0.00619 0.0140** 0.0257** 0.0439**
(0.00399) (0.00453) (0.00558) (0.0128) (0.0193)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0123 -0.0133 -0.0226 -0.0276** -0.0340*
(0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0178)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00153 0.00161 0.000646 0.00283 0.00254
(0.00204) (0.00231) (0.00280) (0.00287) (0.00329)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-1) 0.000263 0.000308 7.11e-05 0.000212 0.000435
(0.000278) (0.000277) (0.000278) (0.000291) (0.000327)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-2) 0.000772** 0.000848** 0.000708* 0.00126***
(0.000301) (0.000345) (0.000406) (0.000450)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-3) -0.000460 7.99e-06 -0.000605
(0.000499) (0.000733) (0.000655)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-4) -0.000242 -0.000778*
(0.000411) (0.000471)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-5) -0.000770*
(0.000463)
SF joint significance (sum) 0.00108 0.000459 0.000686 -0.000463
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.0186 0.516 0.492 0.687
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Wald test Region Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Serially-adjusted standard errors according to Newey and West (1987) are reported in parentheses; * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant, region and time dummies are not shown.
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Table 23: Objectives 1+2+3: Prais-Winsten
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.167*** -0.222*** -0.252*** -0.334*** -0.603***
(0.0299) (0.0364) (0.0498) (0.0633) (0.0571)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00327 0.00618 0.0150*** 0.0268* 0.0450**
(0.00371) (0.00430) (0.00568) (0.0139) (0.0182)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0137 -0.0155 -0.0262** -0.0332** -0.0327**
(0.0108) (0.0115) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0153)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00149 0.00153 0.000464 0.00259 0.00293
(0.00204) (0.00228) (0.00279) (0.00312) (0.00342)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-1) 0.000317 0.000333 0.000125 0.000384 0.000395
(0.000266) (0.000283) (0.000285) (0.000300) (0.000328)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-2) 0.000740** 0.000814** 0.000639 0.00127***
(0.000307) (0.000376) (0.000422) (0.000448)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-3) -0.000533 -0.000235 -0.000549
(0.000440) (0.000686) (0.000727)
Ln Objective2 1+2+3 (t-4) -0.000311 -0.000805*
(0.000439) (0.000479)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-5) -0.000751*
(0.000449)
SF joint significance (sum) 0.00107 0.000406 0.000478 -0.000436
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.0154 0.525 0.615 0.715
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
R-squared 0.482 0.526 0.556 0.606 0.654
Adj. R-squared 0.405 0.446 0.467 0.511 0.547
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Wald test Region Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Serially adjusted standard errors according to the Prais-Winsten method are reported in parentheses; * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant, region and time dummies are not shown.
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Table 24: Objectives 1+2+3: Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.177** -0.237*** -0.281** -0.370*** -0.574***
(0.0784) (0.0901) (0.123) (0.133) (0.100)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00356 0.00619 0.0140* 0.0257** 0.0439**
(0.00659) (0.00708) (0.00771) (0.0119) (0.0195)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.0123 -0.0133 -0.0226 -0.0276** -0.0340**
(0.0251) (0.0211) (0.0189) (0.0125) (0.0148)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.00153* 0.00161 0.000646 0.00283** 0.00254
(0.000918) (0.00126) (0.00152) (0.00131) (0.00230)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-1) 0.000263 0.000308 7.11e-05 0.000212 0.000435
(0.000331) (0.000386) (0.000448) (0.000535) (0.000565)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-2) 0.000772* 0.000848* 0.000708 0.00126**
(0.000439) (0.000486) (0.000671) (0.000590)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-3) -0.000460 7.99e-06 -0.000605*
(0.000422) (0.000396) (0.000336)
Ln Objective2 1+2+3 (t-4) -0.000242 -0.000778
(0.000278) (0.000502)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-5) -0.000770
(0.000505)
SF joint significance (sum) 0.00108 0.000459 0.000686 -0.000463
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.0807 0.645 0.473 0.369
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and are reported parentheses; * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown.
Table 25: Objectives 1+2+3: Two-step system GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP PPS p.c. (t-1) -0.0180 -0.0108 -0.0191 -0.0269* -0.0251
(0.0127) (0.0132) (0.0166) (0.0159) (0.0209)
Ln investment (t-1) -0.00521 -0.00521 0.00157 0.00484 0.0122
(0.00403) (0.00430) (0.00570) (0.0159) (0.0180)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) 0.0127 0.0101 0.00661 0.00512 -0.00304
(0.00838) (0.00799) (0.00913) (0.0101) (0.0126)
Ln innovation (t-1) 0.000595 3.09e-05 0.000655 0.00121 0.00110
(0.00144) (0.00173) (0.00170) (0.00227) (0.00274)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-1) 0.000233 -0.000163 8.57e-05 0.000262 0.000180
(0.000631) (0.000570) (0.000581) (0.000649) (0.000710)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-2) 0.000579** 0.000379 0.000272 0.000472
(0.000295) (0.000343) (0.000449) (0.000500)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-3) -0.000970*** -0.000901** -0.000853
(0.000337) (0.000416) (0.000552)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-4) -0.000528 -0.000806
(0.000456) (0.000631)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-5) -0.000225
(0.000579)
SF joint significance (sum) 0.000417 -0.000506 -0.000895 -0.00123
SF joint significance (p-value) 0.495 0.531 0.232 0.210
Observations 1062 943 826 705 584
Number of regions 124 124 124 124 124
Number of instruments 122 123 120 110 97
AR(1) (p-value) 3.52e-09 2.07e-08 7.45e-08 6.85e-07 4.27e-07
AR(2) (p-value) 0.0817 0.0827 0.259 0.114 0.0557
Hansen (p-value) 0.188 0.228 0.188 0.102 0.0398
Notes: Standard errors are corrected using the approach by Windmeijer (2005) and are listed in parentheses; * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown. Endogenous variables are
real GDP p.c., investment and Obj. 1+2+3, while all other variables are assumed to be exogenous. We instrument the
endogenous variables with both its lags and its differenced lags restricting the laglimit to seven in order to prevent that
the number of instruments exceeds the number of regions. Calculations are done with xtabond2 by Roodman (2006).
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Table 26: Centroids of NUTS regions
NUTS latitude longitude NUTS latitude longitude
code code
be1 50◦ 50’ 9.5994” 4◦ 22’ 13.7994” fr63 45◦ 46’ 26.4” 1◦ 42’ 50.7594”
be2 51◦ 2’ 16.7994” 4◦ 14’ 20.04” fr71 45◦ 25’ 55.2” 5◦ 20’ 4.56”
be3 50◦ 18’ 53.9994” 5◦ 0’ 30.96” fr72 45◦ 39’ 21.5994” 3◦ 10’ 37.2”
dk 55◦ 57’ 36” 10◦ 2’ 23.9994” fr81 43◦ 35’ 38.4” 3◦ 13’ 32.16”
de1 48◦ 32’ 45.5994” 9◦ 2’ 48.1194” fr82 43◦ 57’ 32.4” 6◦ 3’ 37.8”
de2 48◦ 57’ 3.6” 11◦ 25’ 8.4” fr83 42◦ 9’ 7.2” 9◦ 6’ 21.9594”
de3 52◦ 30’ 7.2” 13◦ 24’ 0” ie 53◦ 10’ 29.9994” -8◦ 9’ 12.2394”
de4 52◦ 28’ 22.7994” 13◦ 23’ 52.7994” itc1 45◦ 3’ 25.2” 7◦ 55’ 10.9194”
de5 53◦ 11’ 49.2” 8◦ 44’ 45.24” itc2 45◦ 43’ 51.6” 7◦ 23’ 9.9594”
de6 53◦ 32’ 42” 10◦ 1’ 26.3994” itc3 44◦ 15’ 57.5994” 8◦ 42’ 16.92”
de7 50◦ 36’ 10.8” 9◦ 1’ 52.6794” itc4 45◦ 37’ 1.1994” 9◦ 46’ 9.8394”
de8 53◦ 45’ 7.2” 12◦ 32’ 2.4” itd1 46◦ 41’ 49.2” 11◦ 24’ 57.6”
de9 52◦ 46’ 4.8” 9◦ 9’ 40.68” itd2 46◦ 8’ 5.9994” 11◦ 7’ 15.6”
dea 51◦ 28’ 47.9994” 7◦ 33’ 44.64” itd3 45◦ 39’ 7.2” 11◦ 52’ 8.3994”
deb 49◦ 54’ 50.4” 7◦ 26’ 55.68” itd4 46◦ 9’ 3.6” 13◦ 3’ 21.5994”
ded 51◦ 3’ 7.1994” 13◦ 20’ 52.8” itd5 44◦ 32’ 9.6” 11◦ 1’ 11.9994”
dee 52◦ 0’ 46.7994” 11◦ 42’ 3.6” ite1 43◦ 27’ 3.6” 11◦ 7’ 33.5994”
def 54◦ 10’ 58.7994” 9◦ 48’ 57.6” ite2 42◦ 57’ 57.6” 12◦ 29’ 24”
deg 50◦ 54’ 14.4” 11◦ 1’ 33.5994” ite3 43◦ 21’ 54” 13◦ 6’ 28.8”
gr11 41◦ 9’ 46.7994” 25◦ 8’ 20.3994” ite4 41◦ 58’ 30” 12◦ 46’ 30”
gr12 40◦ 44’ 34.8” 22◦ 57’ 25.2” itf1 42◦ 13’ 40.8” 13◦ 51’ 18”
gr13 40◦ 21’ 43.2” 21◦ 29’ 2.4” itf2 41◦ 41’ 2.3994” 14◦ 35’ 42”
gr14 39◦ 31’ 58.8” 22◦ 12’ 57.6” itf3 40◦ 51’ 35.9994” 14◦ 50’ 23.9994”
gr21 39◦ 36’ 3.5994” 20◦ 47’ 2.3994” itf4 40◦ 59’ 2.4” 16◦ 37’ 12”
gr23 38◦ 16’ 55.1994” 21◦ 34’ 26.4” itf5 40◦ 30’ 0” 16◦ 4’ 51.5994”
gr24 38◦ 39’ 18” 22◦ 50’ 9.5994” itf6 39◦ 4’ 4.7994” 16◦ 20’ 49.2”
gr25 37◦ 20’ 34.8” 22◦ 27’ 28.7994” itg1 37◦ 35’ 20.3994” 14◦ 8’ 45.6”
gr31 37◦ 50’ 27.6” 23◦ 36’ 3.5994” itg2 40◦ 5’ 16.8” 9◦ 1’ 51.24”
gr42 36◦ 44’ 45.6” 26◦ 18’ 21.6” nl1 53◦ 3’ 46.8” 6◦ 20’ 7.08”
gr43 35◦ 13’ 44.3994” 24◦ 50’ 45.6” nl2 52◦ 15’ 46.7994” 6◦ 3’ 25.56”
es11 42◦ 45’ 21.6” -7◦ 54’ 36.7194” nl3 52◦ 4’ 22.8” 4◦ 35’ 33.7194”
es12 43◦ 17’ 31.2” -5◦ 59’ 37.3194” nl4 51◦ 27’ 14.4” 5◦ 24’ 51.4794”
es13 43◦ 11’ 52.8” -4◦ 1’ 49.08” at1 48◦ 8’ 59.9994” 15◦ 53’ 31.1994”
es21 43◦ 2’ 38.3994” -2◦ 36’ 59.76” at2 47◦ 5’ 16.8” 14◦ 36’ 46.7994”
es22 42◦ 40’ 1.2” -1◦ 38’ 45.9594” at3 47◦ 34’ 15.5994” 12◦ 34’ 51.5994”
es23 42◦ 16’ 29.9994” -2◦ 31’ 2.28” pt11 41◦ 27’ 25.2” -7◦ 40’ 43.6794”
es24 41◦ 31’ 12” 0◦ 39’ 35.388” pt15 37◦ 14’ 38.3994” -8◦ 7’ 54.48”
es30 40◦ 29’ 41.9994” -3◦ 43’ 1.92” pt16 40◦ 7’ 19.1994” -8◦ 0’ 23.0394”
es41 41◦ 45’ 14.3994” -4◦ 46’ 54.84” pt17 38◦ 42’ 36” -9◦ 0’ 37.08”
es42 39◦ 34’ 51.6” -3◦ 0’ 16.2” pt18 38◦ 29’ 27.5994” -8◦ 0’ 57.24”
es43 39◦ 11’ 27.6” -6◦ 9’ 2.88” fi1 64◦ 31’ 19.2” 26◦ 12’ 17.9994”
es51 41◦ 47’ 56.3994” -1◦ 31’ 43.6794” fi2 60◦ 12’ 50.3994” 20◦ 6’ 57.5994”
es52 39◦ 24’ 7.2” 0◦ 33’ 17.676” se11 59◦ 28’ 37.1994” 18◦ 10’ 58.7994”
es53 39◦ 34’ 30” 2◦ 54’ 51.4794” se12 59◦ 14’ 31.1994” 16◦ 8’ 52.7994”
es61 37◦ 27’ 46.8” -4◦ 34’ 32.1594” se21 57◦ 13’ 11.9994” 15◦ 23’ 13.2”
es62 38◦ 0’ 7.2” -1◦ 29’ 8.52” se22 56◦ 1’ 15.6” 13◦ 56’ 9.5994”
fr10 48◦ 42’ 32.4” 2◦ 30’ 9.36” se23 58◦ 1’ 33.6” 12◦ 46’ 19.2”
fr21 48◦ 44’ 9.5994” 4◦ 32’ 28.3194” se31 60◦ 48’ 14.4” 14◦ 34’ 37.1994”
fr22 49◦ 38’ 34.8” 2◦ 48’ 30.2394” se32 63◦ 12’ 36” 15◦ 11’ 23.9994”
fr23 49◦ 23’ 31.2” 1◦ 0’ 43.9194” se33 66◦ 14’ 34.7994” 19◦ 19’ 8.3994”
fr24 47◦ 29’ 5.9994” 1◦ 41’ 3.1194” ukc 55◦ 1’ 12” -1◦ 54’ 21.2394”
fr25 48◦ 55’ 44.4” 0◦ 31’ 17.8314” ukd 54◦ 3’ 25.2” -2◦ 43’ 23.16”
fr26 47◦ 14’ 52.7994” 4◦ 8’ 57.48” uke 53◦ 57’ 54” -1◦ 13’ 44.76”
fr30 50◦ 28’ 19.2” 2◦ 42’ 54.36” ukf 52◦ 55’ 37.1994” 0◦ 48’ 24.768”
fr41 48◦ 45’ 43.2” 6◦ 8’ 31.9194” ukg 52◦ 28’ 47.9994” -2◦ 16’ 14.8794”
fr42 48◦ 19’ 47.9994” 7◦ 26’ 7.0794” ukh 52◦ 15’ 3.5994” 0◦ 32’ 23.3514”
fr43 47◦ 12’ 28.7994” 6◦ 5’ 16.8” uki 51◦ 30’ 3.5994” 0◦ 6’ 42.732”
fr51 47◦ 28’ 40.8” 0◦ 48’ 55.9794” ukj 51◦ 16’ 51.5994” 0◦ 32’ 4.8114”
fr52 48◦ 10’ 40.7994” -2◦ 50’ 27.24” ukk 51◦ 0’ 3.5994” -3◦ 7’ 49.8”
fr53 46◦ 9’ 46.7994” 0◦ 4’ 52.1112” ukl 52◦ 20’ 9.5994” -3◦ 45’ 46.44”
fr61 44◦ 21’ 17.9994” 0◦ 13’ 33.996” ukm 56◦ 51’ 0” -4◦ 10’ 42.2394”
fr62 43◦ 46’ 8.3994” 1◦ 29’ 15” ukn 54◦ 36’ 35.9994” -6◦ 42’ 6.84”
Notes: The abbreviations of the NUTS code follow European Commission (2007). The centroids of the NUTS regions
expressed in decimal degrees are calculated using the Matlab toolbox “Arc Mat” (LeSage and Pace, 2004). Subsequently,
they are converted to lattitude and longitude coordinates.
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Table 27: Objective 1: Spatial panel lag model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.144*** -0.1463*** -0.1856*** -0.218*** -0.2824*** -0.3894***
(0.01498) (0.01493) (0.01659) (0.01891) (0.0222) (0.02661)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.0036 0.0035 0.0058* 0.0133*** 0.0171*** 0.0288***
(0.00285) (0.00282) (0.00314) (0.00383) (0.00625) (0.00726)
Ln pop. growth (t-1) -0.0112 -0.0083 -0.0152 -0.0215** -0.0198* -0.0293***
(0.0094) (0.00946) (0.00991) (0.01028) (0.01083) (0.01121)
Ln innovation (t-1) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.00025) (0.00025) (0.00026) (0.00021) (0.00034) (0.00022)
Ln Objective 1 (t-1) 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.00089) (0.00000) (0.00035) (0.00041) (0.00025)
Ln Objective 1 (t-2) 0.0006* 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003
(0.00031) (0.00035) (0.00057) (0.00038)
Ln Objective 1 (t-3) 0.0012*** 0.0009** 0.0006*
(0.00034) (0.00036) (0.00036)
Ln Objective 1 (t-4) 0.0004 0.0001
(0.00035) (0.0004)
Ln Objective 1 (t-5) -0.0004
(0.00043)
SF joint significance (sum) 0.0006*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0005***
SF joint significance (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ρ 0.233*** 0.244*** 0.26*** 0.288*** 0.313*** 0.36***
(0.05364) (0.05305) (0.05356) (0.05404) (0.05433) (0.05186)
Observations 1230 1230 1107 984 861 738
R-squared 0.5042 0.5089 0.5478 0.5654 0.5983 0.652
Adj. R-squared 0.4425 0.4473 0.4838 0.4951 0.5221 0.5725
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; constant, country and time dummies are not shown. Calculations are done with
the Matlab routine sar panel by Elhorst (2004).
Table 28: Objective 2: Spatial panel lag model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.1455*** -0.1816*** -0.2057*** -0.2801*** -0.4147***
(0.01494) (0.01652) (0.01871) (0.02208) (0.02596)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.0033 0.0056* 0.0124*** 0.0164*** 0.0299***
(0.00282) (0.00317) (0.00383) (0.00623) (0.00713)
Ln pop. growth (t-1) -0.0107 -0.0141 -0.0217** -0.0201* -0.0224**
(0.0094) (0.00976) (0.01012) (0.0107) (0.01088)
Ln innovation (t-1) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00021) (0.00018) (0.00018)
Ln Objective 2 (t-1) -0.0005 -0.0004** -0.0005** -0.0004* -0.0005**
(-0.00081) (0.0002) (0.00024) (0.00022) (0.00022)
Ln Objective 2 (t-2) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00000) (0.00032) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Ln Objective 2 (t-3) -0.0006*** -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.00025) (0.00036)
Ln Objective 2 (t-4) -0.0007** -0.0009***
(0.00028) (0.00032)
Ln Objective 2 (t-5) -0.0013***
(0.00029)
SF joint significance (sum) -0.0004*** -0.001*** -0.0013*** -0.0026***
SF joint significance (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ρ 0.231*** 0.266*** 0.296*** 0.312*** 0.356***
(0.05351) (0.05327) (0.05358) (0.05442) (0.05106)
Observations 1230 1107 984 861 738
R-squared 0.507 0.5485 0.5666 0.5989 0.6641
Adj. R-squared 0.4452 0.4847 0.4964 0.5229 0.5874
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; constant, country and time dummies are not shown. Calculations are done with
the Matlab routine sar panel by Elhorst (2004).
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Table 29: Objective 3: Spatial panel lag model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.141*** -0.1779*** -0.2041*** -0.2673*** -0.3825***
(0.01496) (0.01666) (0.01892) (0.02214) (0.02606)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.0039 0.0061* 0.0128*** 0.0156** 0.026***
(0.00282) (0.0032) (0.00383) (0.00631) (0.00722)
Ln pop. growth (t-1) -0.013 -0.0165* -0.0244** -0.0216** -0.028**
(0.00943) (0.00983) (0.01028) (0.01081) (0.01099)
Ln innovation (t-1) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.00023) (0.00024) (0.00031) (0.00018) (0.00017)
Ln Objective 3 (t-1) -0.0004 -0.0003** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0006***
(-0.00056) (0.00015) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00019)
Ln Objective 3 (t-2) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000
(0.00029) (0.0002) (0.00022) (0.00000)
Ln Objective 3 (t-3) -0.0003** -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.00015) (0.00023) (0.00015)
Ln Objective 3 (t-4) 0.0001 0.0005***
(0.00018) (0.00018)
Ln Objective 3 (t-5) -0.0007***
(0.00019)
SF joint significance (sum) -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0002* -0.001***
SF joint significance (p-value) (0.007) (0.000) (0.0649) (0.000)
ρ 0.234*** 0.255*** 0.275*** 0.3059*** 0.331***
(0.05324) (0.0537) (0.0547) (0.05471) (0.05163)
Observations 1230 1107 984 861 738
R-squared 0.5075 0.5463 0.5607 0.5953 0.6571
Adj. R-squared 0.4457 0.4822 0.4896 0.5186 0.5788
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; constant, country and time dummies are not shown. Calculations are done with
the Matlab routine sar panel by Elhorst (2004).
Table 30: Objectives 1+2+3: Spatial panel lag model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.1439*** -0.1837*** -0.2101*** -0.2821*** -0.4025***
(0.01499) (0.01657) (0.01909) (0.02205) (0.02565)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.0036 0.006* 0.0128*** 0.0163*** 0.0287***
(0.00287) (0.00317) (0.00385) (0.00627) (0.00715)
Ln pop. growth (t-1) -0.0113 -0.0131 -0.0192* -0.0163 -0.0207*
(0.00943) (0.00973) (0.01028) (0.01072) (0.01097)
Ln innovation (t-1) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.00025) (0.00026) (0.00024) (0.00025) (0.00033)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-1) 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00022) (0.00018) (0.00024)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-2) 0.0004* 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003
(0.00022) (0.00025) (0.00026) (0.00021)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-3) -0.0001 0.0005* 0.0006**
(0.00025) (0.00026) (0.00026)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-4) -0.0005* -0.0009***
(0.00026) (0.00035)
Ln Objectives 1+2+3 (t-5) -0.0009***
(0.00027)
SF joint significance (sum) 0.0004** 0.0001 0.0000 -0.001***
SF joint significance (p-value) (0.0428) (0.7815) (0.7313) (0.0003)
ρ 0.233*** 0.265*** 0.286*** 0.318*** 0.355***
(0.05363) (0.05345) (0.05466) (0.0551) (0.05347)
Observations 1230 1107 984 861 738
R-squared 0.5042 0.548 0.5598 0.5984 0.661
Adj. R-squared 0.442 0.4841 0.4885 0.5223 0.5835
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; constant, country and time dummies are not shown. Calculations are done with



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 34: Results of the LSDV approach using 4-years averaged dataset
No Objective Objective Objective Objectives
funds 1 2 3 1+2+3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln real GDP PPS p.c. (t-1) -0.277* -0.322*** -0.311** -0.292** -0.252*
(0.147) (0.113) (0.138) (0.131) (0.145)
Ln investment (t-1) 0.00579 0.00978 0.00511 0.0147 0.00286
(0.0121) (0.00985) (0.0123) (0.0110) (0.0116)
Ln pop. growth + 0.05 (t-1) -0.243** -0.182** -0.231** -0.209** -0.274***
(0.104) (0.0722) (0.104) (0.0976) (0.0996)
Ln innovation (t-1) -0.00508 -0.00601 -0.00919 -0.0198* -0.00688
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0114)
Ln Objective 1 (t-1) 0.00409 -0.00487*** -0.00366*** -0.00291
(0.00351) (0.00119) (0.000751) (0.00227)
Observations 244 244 244 244 244
Number of regions 123 123 123 123 123
R-squared 0.692 0.702 0.724 0.728 0.702
Adj. R-squared 0.685 0.695 0.717 0.722 0.695
Wald test Time Dummies (p-value) 0.0745 0.0612 0.295 0.655 0.155
Notes: White-Huber heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%; constant and time dummies are not shown.
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